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Institutional Aspects of International Governance
ELISABETH ZOLLER*
ProfessorElisabeth Zoller discusses the domain and the methods
of internationalgovernance. In PartI, she addresses the notion of the
"international community."
Professor Zoller argues that the
internationalcommunity is not really a community at all, but several
"intertangledcommunities" with common interests. These common
interests emerged as a result of several worldwide events, such as
World War I and the Great Depression. The author asserts that
common interests among nation states andpriority setting are the two
prerequisitesnecessaryfor internationalgovernance. In Part II, the
authorexamines the methods of internationalgovernance, beginning
with the proposition that governance is linked to power. Although
power is decentralized in internationalgovernance, it can still be
exercised collectively. Professor Zoller continues by describing the
evolution of a model of internationalgovernance. She concludes by
suggestingthat the shortcomings of global regulation,especially with
respect to environmental issues, can be addressedmost effectively by
the institutionalaspects of internationalgovernance. To that end, the
success of international governance, in terms of international
environmentalprotection,depends upon the leadership exerted by the
"greatpowers, "specifically the UnitedStates.
Many students of international law and politics are inclined to use the term
"anarchy" to designate a society of sovereign states. For them, anarchy
necessarily exists when there is no authority to order the state how to act.
Drawing on Hobbes, they usually explain the essence of the "anarchic"
international system by the fact that there is no actor with legitimate authority
to tell a state what to do.
Such a simplistic approach to the international society has never fit reality.
Since the beginning of the modem international society, as it came into being
with the Peace Treaties of Westphalia (1648),' sovereign states have never

* Professor of Law, University Panthton-Assas (Paris 11). Visiting Professor of Law, Indiana
University School of Law - Bloomington. I should like to express my thanks to Eric Norman Ward for
his help.
1. See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia(1648-1948), 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20 (1948).

GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:121

acted toward each other in an "anarchic" manner. True, states have never
behaved as members of a political society because an international society of
states is not a polity. However, they have never carried out their mutual
intercourse in a chaotic manner without any regard for common rules.
Whether we refer to the Eurocentric model of the nineteenth century or to the
contemporary global society, the conduct of states has always been determined
by certain principles, norms, rules, and procedures. This is because the
allegedly "anarchic" international society possesses international institutions.
Robert Keohane has suggested that "when we ask whether 'x' is an institution,
we ask whether we can identify persistent sets of rules that constrain activity,
shape expectations, and prescribe roles."' Broadly speaking, institutions are
the traditions, basic rules, and organization of a society.
Because of international institutions, states know what to expect from each
other. On a day-to-day basis, states can routinely foresee and predict the
responses of other states. They usually adjust their conduct to the behavior of
their counterparts. This pattern of mutual expectations and reciprocal behavior
represents the very fabric of the international order. When we refer to the
"order" of the international society, we necessarily imply that this society is
"governed" in the loose sense of the term. Thus, under certain conditions, it
is legitimate to refer to an international "governance." However, one should
bear in mind that governance among sovereign and equal states is bound to be
a "governance without government."' Oran R. Young explains that this idea
"refers to the role that social institutions or governance systems, in contrast to
organizations or material entities, play in solving the collective action
problems that pervade social relations under conditions of interdependence." 4
This paper attempts to determine which institutions make this international
governance possible.
Governance means setting priorities and using power to attain them. It can
take many forms, such as setting rules and regulations, providing incentives
and support, promising rewards, or threatening punishments. However, no
matter the various forms it may take, governance calls into question two major
issues: The first-what is going to be governed-will be discussed in Part I; the
second issue--how this will be governed-will be addressed in Part II.

2. ROBERT D. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER 164 (1989).

3. See Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (James N. Rosenau
& Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
4. ORAN R.YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS
SoCIETY 16 (1994).
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I. THE DOMAIN OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

The domain of international governance raises a perennial question in the
theory of international law: What are the common interests of a society of
states? Not so long ago, it was still possible to give a rather simple and
straightforward answer to this question. The international society, a society
with limited common interests, never had a sense of "commonness" similar
to that of national communities.' In spite of the oft-quoted expression
"international community," the international society is barely a community.
Rather, there are several intertangled communities instead of the community
as a whole.6 For example, there is an international community of merchantseamen, international scholars, writers, scientists, and ecologists. 7 The truth
is that a society of states has no common political project, but has as many
national projects as there are states. As long as the nation-state remains the
community in which most men and women envision the fulfillment of their
social needs, nation-states will continue to find ways to carry on their day-today intercourse in an orderly and predictable fashion. That is the role for
which states have chosen to use international law as the fundamental
institution of the international society. For that purpose, international law has
proven to be a serviceable instrument.'
International governance, as provided by the institutions of classical
international law, was necessarily limited. The common ground of nationstates was commensurate with the limited needs of the international society.
After World War I, the common interests of states expanded tremendously.
In the same manner that the Civil War transformed the United States, World
War I radically modified the international society. Common interests between
states principally developed as the result of scientific and technological
progress and the economic expansion that followed.
Like economic crises, serious military crises tended to become worldwide, though to a lesser degree. Accordingly, two events are crucial to
5. "Commonness," as employed here to define the shared hopes and aspirations of a people, is not
in the least identical to res communis as it is understood by Henkin (commonage). Louis Henkin, General
Course on Public InternationalLaw, 216 R.C.A.D.I. 105, 105-26 (1989).
6. Tonnies' two concepts Gemeinschafi (community) and Gesellschaft (society) are helpful, by
analogy, in understanding the problem. FERDINAND ToNNIEs, COMMuNrrY & SociETY 33-35 (Charles P.
Loomis trans., Transaction Books 1988) (1957).

7. See

PAUL REUTER, ETUDE DE LA RtGLE:

TouTE PRISE

DOIT RTRE JUGtE

(1933). Paul Reuter

interestingly refers to "la premiere communautd internationale, celle des gens de mer" ("the first
international community, that of men of the sea").
8. See JAMES BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 78 (4th ed. 1949).
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understanding how states eventually became enmeshed in the web of
interdependence which has greatly reduced their freedom of action. First, the
Great War demonstrated in the most tragic manner that questions of peace and
security were a common concern for all states. The Great War marked the first
time a war could be world-wide; this was made possible, if not inevitable, by
technological progress. As it became an all-out war, World War I affected
international society as a whole. Peace became a common interest for all
states, and an institutional framework, the League of Nations, was created to
insure that this common interest would be protected.' Collective security was
the basic rule of this new institution.
The second event that dramatically expanded the common interest of states
was the Great Depression. The economic crisis that plagued the industrialized
world during the 1930s demonstrated that national wealth and economic
growth had become a matter of international concern. The Great Depression
made common economic interests between states a matter of collective
concern.'" After World War II, these common interests were given their
institutional foundations by the Bretton Woods system" and GATT. 2 Similar
to the League of Nations, this new international economic system involved
normative aspects, new rules and principles, new organizations and agencies,
and structural elements.
Whether political or economic, common interests between states emerged
more as a matter of experience than as a matter of logic. The historical record
shows that a consciousness of common interests between states comes into
being when there is tangible evidence that action has to be taken. As long as
common interests are looming on the horizon, the chance that they will
materialize in the form of international institutions remains slim. In other
words, common interests have to go through a process of crystallization in
order to be taken into account by some sort of international institution. They
have to be perceived as real. Until this process has occurred, the common
interests of states will not be institutionalized. They will remain within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the states and will not become part of the international
''commonness."

9. D.W. BowErr, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 17 (4th ed. 1982).
10. ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GAT'T LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DILOMAcY 5-7 (2d ed.
1990).
11. Bretton Woods Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, as amended May 31,
1968,20 U.S.T.2775.
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. All, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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In addition to common interests, a second prerequisite for governance is
a setting of priorities. For example, the difficulty with environmental matters
is the wide and sharp disagreement as to which priorities ought to be put on the
agenda. Industrialized countries and developing states do not share identical
views on ecological issues. Moreover, there are disagreements among
scientists and academics as to the reality of potential economic dangers. For
instance, with respect to the 1995 flood disasters in Europe, the media has
made much of the hypothesis that weather patterns have been insidiously
affected by global warming. But many climatologists believe that evidence is
still insufficient to draw a direct link between changing weather patterns and
the recent flood disasters. The common interests of states regarding many
environmental issues have not yet crystallized. Hence, many scholars are
disillusioned by the paucity of international environmental law."
The reason for a loose and weak international governance in
environmental issues lies within the very substance of the issues themselves,
not with international institutions. Should environmental matters be perceived
as genuine threats to the common interests of states, international institutions
are available to address these threats. For instance, the mandate of the United
Nations Security Council is so broad that it could, if necessary, lawfully
address environmental dangers to international peace and security. As a
practical matter, it remains within the discretion of the Security Council to
decide what is a "threat to the peace."' 4
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the domain of international
governance is always a faithful image of the common interests of states.
Where there is international governance of some sort, there always will be
common interests between states. It remains to be seen how these common
interests come into being and, in particular, whether the market automatically
produces them. Should the latter occur, the global market would be the
governor, and the institution of international governance would be irrelevant.
The idea that the market is self-contained, self-sustained, and self-regulated is
well-received today in academic and political circles. Indeed, this idea is at the
heart of the "Contract with America" which the Republican Party entered into
with the American people. 5
13. See, e.g.,
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
(Peter M. Hass et al. eds., 1993).
14. See HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 725-26 (1951).
15. REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMrIrEE, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT
GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION (Ed Gillespie & Bob
Schellhas eds., 1994)
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This "automatic pilot" theory of the market is among the basic tenets of
liberalism. For economists and political thinkers, such as Adam Smith or
Herbert Spencer, social harmony is spontaneous. It does not require coercive
force to be produced or maintained. Laissez-faire, the pursuit by each
individual of his own interests, produces social cooperation automatically.
Whether this theory actually works, in terms of private individuals in their
capacity as rational economic agents, has already been challenged and remains
an open question.I6 The theory holds some truth, provided that the individual
in question is the homo economicus motivated by self-interest. However, the
proposition that this theory also applies to the global market, deemed to consist
only of independent agents trading for their own account and competing
against each other, is disputable. The actors of the global market (firms,
"privatized" government agencies, and persons) are independent agents only
to a limited extent. Next to them, or behind them, are states with national
goals and political projects. These powerful political groups are driven by
other motives. More often than not, national administrations put their full
weight behind the efforts of national firms to win significant contracts
abroad. 7 Therefore, it may be true that impassionate economic rationality
governs the global market. But this is not the case with global society, where
economic rationality coexists with a struggle for power."
Accordingly, it is highly unrealistic to believe that automatic governance
could spontaneously emerge from the global society. International governance
is neither self-established nor coercively produced. The truth lies between the
two possibilities because, as Charles De Visscher states, "the demands of
coexistence awaken a consciousness of certain social values which shapes and
sustains a teleological and functional conception of power."' The extent to
which power becomes a crucial factor in sustaining governance remains to be
seen.

16. See EMILE DURKHEiM, THE DvSION OF LABOR INSOCIETY 200-29 (George Simpson trans., Free
Press 1964) (1893). The current discussion is but the Durkheim-Spencer debate recast.
17. Competition in the global marketplace is increasingly backed by high intensity nation-states
advocacy. For the United States, see Toward a National Export Strategy: U.S. Jobs: U.S. Exports, Report
to the Congress, Sept. 30, 1993 and the remarks of Jeffrey E. Garten, Under Secretary of Commerce for
International Trade, Before the Council on Foreign Relations, Jan. 9, 1995.
18. Despite the rhetoric, there is still much truth to Edward H. Carr's devastating criticism of "the
paradise of laissez-faire." EDWARD H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISES (1919-1939) 43-46 (1962).
19. CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY INPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 145 (P.E. Corbett

trans., 1968).
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II. THE METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Governance may not require a government, but if successful, it ultimately
differentiates between the governors on the one hand and the governed on the
other. Governance is thus linked to power. In its most general form,
governance is similar to power; it involves getting others to do the things you
want them to do.
At the international level, governance is paradoxically both easier and
more difficult to insure than at the domestic level. It is easier because the
dramatic inequality of power between states operates as a de facto radical
division between the strong and the weak. However, governance is more
difficult because nothing dejure can be drawn from this defacto inequality,
since the weak states, like the strong, are sovereign entities. The principle of
the sovereign equality of states acts as a litmus test, dividing legitimate and
illegitimate governance at the international level. Sovereign equality must be
satisfied in one way or another for governance to be accepted and successful.
Interestingly, international society possesses the institutions which make it
possible for international governance to be compatible with the sovereign
equality of states.
The proposition that the international society remains unorganized hardly
needs demonstration. Much of the legal system is entirely based on the
voluntary consent of the members of the society; if they refuse to consent, the
rules may not come into being. Many scholars build on the unorganized state
of the international society to demonstrate that international institutions are
solely dependent on the will of the states. It is plainly clear that whether we
address treaty law or customary law, the will of the states is a decisive
element in the international law-making process.
The rules do not, in every circumstance, require the express consent of a
state to be enforceable against it. Should this be the case, many universal laws
would disappear, since it would be necessary to prove that each one had been
accepted by every state of the world.
This is not how things work at the international level. Instead, a
customary rule may be used against a state even if none of the cases cited is
taken from that state. This is conditioned upon a finding of enough precedent
to leave no doubt in the rule's universal character. This condition is usually
considered to be fulfilled in regimes established by a group of states as
objective, or based on a status. The expression "objective situation" may be
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usefully applied to the status of Antarctica as defined by the Antarctic Treaty,2'
completed by the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection. 2' The Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning reparation for
injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations refers to the same idea:
"Fifty states representing the vast majority of the members of the international
community, have the power, in conformity with international law, to bring into
being an entity possessing objective international personality, and not merely
personality recognized by them alone."'
A similar idea recurs in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. 23 In those
cases, the International Court of Justice was requested to give its opinion as to
whether a norm of customary law in favor of the equidistance principle could
have emerged simultaneously or immediately subsequent to the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf. In addressing the transformation of a
treaty rule into a customary norm, the ICJ addressed a key issue in
international governance, namely, to what extent a group of states can make
law for other states. Despite the sovereign equality of states, the Court had no
qualms in accepting this possibility. It considered that "a very widespread and
representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided
it included that of states whose interests were specially affected." The Court
even said that this law-making process should take a very short time provided
that state practices, including those of states whose interests are specially
affected, are both extensive and virtually uniform in terms of the provision
invoked.
The transformation of a treaty norm into a customary rule is the most
common device by which international governance is made possible. In the
North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the law-making process in international
society was at stake. The Court accepted a quasi-legislative function on the
International
part of those states whose interests were specially affected.'
governance is not lacking because of institutional weakness; it is lacking
because of an absence of political will. Absent a clear political will to use
existing international institutions effectively, the machinery of international
governance remains at a standstill.
20. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794,402 U.N.T.S. 71.
21. Antarctica Treaty's Protocol on Environmental Protection: Final Act, 30 I.L.M. 1455 (1991).
22. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (U.N. v. U.S.; U.N. v. Fr.;
U.N. v. Beig.), 1949 I.C.J. 178 (Apr. 11).
23. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 42 (Feb. 20).
24. See Krystyna Marek, Le Problime des Sources du Droit Internationaldans L 'arr9tsur le Plateau
Continentalde la Mer du Nord, 1970 REVUE BELGE DE DROrIT INTERNATIONAL 44.

1995]

INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE

Whether it is addressed as a matter of customary law or as a matter of
treaty law, the normative aspect of international governance eventually leads
to the same end result. International institutions do exist that enable a group
of states, often under the guidance of a leader, to steer the international society
of states as a whole towards certain priorities. Concrete examples abound:
freedom of navigation on the high sea, the non-use of armed force except in
self-defense, respect and protection of fundamental human rights, and nonproliferation rules for nuclear weapons. In all these cases, international
governance originated in an initiative taken by one, or a few, states; it was
carried out in an international instrument of some sort, usually a treaty or a
declaration, which eventually became the law of the international society.
Where does that lead us? Simply to this: Governance is effectuated through
law, and law comes into being through power. In the case of international
governance, the problem is somewhat more intricate because power is
decentralized. However, this drawback, which could potentially prevent
international governance from existing at all, is alleviated by the fact that
power may be exercised collectively. This is the raison d'etre of international
organizations.
During the nineteenth century, international governance was effectuated
by a de facto government composed of the Great Powers. This was the
Concert of Europe. It may be said that the governance provided by the
Concert was an unpalatable experience for smaller powers who had to endure
the superiority of the stronger powers. But this is not the decisive issue. The
truth of the matter is that this defacto government met an urgent need which
the law took into account. Since then, governance has never left the
international stage. The only change, albeit an important one, is that
international governance has been legitimized because states have entrusted
such governance to institutions more democratic than the Concert of Europe.
Today, international governance is entrusted to the United Nations and its
specialized agencies. With respect to contemporary international legitimacy,
any other arrangement is almost inconceivable. As a matter of law,
international governance entrusted to a single and all-encompassing universal
organization is a logical consequence of the principle of the sovereign equality
of states. It is the only way that international governance can be
democratically exercised.
After World War II, international organizations, in particular the United
Nations and its specialized agencies, were established to give the world
democratic instruments for international governance.
At that time,
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international organizations and international regimes were two sides of the
same coin. The international organizations referred to the structural or
institutional arrangements, whereas the international regimes referred to the
norms and principles laid down by these organizations.
The model of international governance envisioned after World War II was
actually a projection of the New Deal Regulatory State.25 The proposition that
the "Administrative State" encountered dire times with deregulation needs no
further discussion. There is little doubt that the powerful deregulation
movement initiated in the United States in the late 1970s had some spill-over
effects on the international scene. In particular, the new thinking fostered selfregulation by the market instead of regulation directed by institutions or
agencies. An open question remains whether adequate environmental
protection can be insured solely through the magic help of the invisible hand.
What came to be known as "the tragedy of the commons" originated in the
demonstration that the market fails to protect the global commons.26
Although "global regulation is now developing around certain
environmental issues,"27 many scholars believe it is still an insufficient and
piecemeal attempt to meet global needs. The shortcomings of global
regulation call for the enhancement of the institutional aspects of international
governance. For example, it has been suggested that the U.N. Charter be
amended, even to the extent of creating a new organ to address environmental
concerns.2" It is doubtful, however, that a new organ is necessary given the
29
General Assembly's broad powers to address "social and.., health" issues,
the ECOSOC's competence to prepare "draft conventions" with respect to
"economic ...health, and related matters,"3 not to mention the Security
Council's core mandate to deal with "threats to the peace."'"

25. See Anne-Marie Burley, Regulating the World:

Multilateralism,International Law, and the

Projectionof the New Deal Regulatory State, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND PRAxIS
OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FORM 125-56 (John G. Ruggie ed., 1993).
26. See BRUCE RUSSETT & HARVEY STARR, WORLD POLITICS: THE MENU FOR CHOICE 456-58 (4th

ed. 1992).
27. ALFRED C. AMAN JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW INA GLOBAL ERA 131(1992).
28. See Patricia Birnie, The UN and the Environment, in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD: THE
UN's ROLES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 327 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2d ed. 1993).
See also Paul C. Szasz, Restructuring the InternationalOrganizationalFramework in ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEw CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS 340, 356-76 (Edith Brown Weiss
ed., 1992).
29. U.N. CHARTERart. 13, 1.
30. U.N. CHARTER, art. 62, IN 1, 3.
31. Kelsen, supra note 14, at 726. See also Wilhelm Wengler, InternationalLaw and the Concept
of a New World Order,in FEDERALISM-IN-THE-MAKING 122, 122-24 (McWhinney et al. eds., 1992).
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As this paper demonstrates, although states possess the necessary
institutions for international governance, they lack the political will to make
use of them. In this respect, the problem is first and foremost a political one.
International governance is a matter of power. 2 To this extent, the role of the
great powers, particularly the United States, is crucial to the success of
international governance. International environmental protection is a matter
of leadership; in that field, as in many others, the United States is "bound to
lead." 3 Insofar as the United States is a democratic power, private citizens are
ultimately responsible for ensuring that its leadership is heading in the right
direction.

32. This aspect of the problem is well-seen and discerned in ANDREW HURRELL & BENEDICT
KINGSBURY, The International Politics of the Environment: An Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL
POLMCS OF THE ENviRONMENT 1, 1-47 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992).
33. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., BOUND TO LEAD: THE CHANGINGNATURE OF AMERICAN POWER (1990).

